No Shotgun Pleadings, says court

By Missy Meggison

This article was originally published on June 25, 2025, in InsideARM:

No Shotgun Pleadings, says court - insideARM

The District Court in Alabama – a common venue for certain consumer attorneys – isn’t mincing words when it comes to how consumers must plead Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) cases and how Regulation F should be considered in FDCPA actions. Within the context of a recent lawsuit, the court cautioned against “shotgun pleadings” and dismissed a suit on the basis that Regulation F is not synonymous with the FDCPA, and the court is not required to defer to it.

In the case of Kinney v. Tasman Credit Corp (No. 2:2024-cv-01440), the consumer alleged that the defendant debt collector violated the FDCPA by making three calls (during a seven-week period) after she sent an email stating she did not want to receive telephone calls. In her original complaint, she listed sections of the FDCPA, along with some subsections and subparagraphs, but did not provide enough information for the court to understand the precise claims she was bringing against the debt collector.

In its order requiring the consumer to replead her complaint, the Court strongly encouraged “a district court that receives a shotgun pleading [to] strike it and instruct counsel to replead the case—even if the other party does not move the court to strike the pleading.”  

In her replead complaint, the consumer alleged that Reg F gave her the right to choose the medium of communication the debt collector was required to use. Therefore, by calling her three times over seven weeks after she indicated another method of communication was more convenient, she claimed the debt collector violated the FDCPA. The debt collector countered that the phone calls did not amount to harassing, oppressive, or abusive conduct as is required to show an FDCPA violation.

The Court agreed with the debt collector and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Regarding the consumers allegation that the three phone calls amounted to conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse, the court remarked that claims under section 1692d of the FDCPA should be viewed from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances make them more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse. Receiving three phone calls may have been inconvenient, but there is no indication that the calls were intended to intimidate, were coercive, or were invasive.

The consumer further alleged that the calls were false, deceptive, or misleading because by making the calls, the debt collector misrepresented that it was allowed to call her despite her instruction not to do so. In rejecting this argument, the court remarked:

• Nothing in the FDCPA itself provides that a person can dictate the medium of communication used by a debt collector.

• Regulation F is not the FDCPA; it is a regulation implementing the FDCPA

• Even if Reg F properly implemented a rule prohibiting debt collectors from using a medium of communication that a consumer had requested the debt collector not use (as alleged by the consumer), it is not clear how violation of the rule would be false, deceptive, or misleading in the connection of the collection of a debt.

• Violating an administrative rule is not, by itself, false, deceptive, or misleading.

insideARM Perspective

The ARM industry has grown accustomed to shotgun pleadings. We are used to seeing complaints that include little detail, yet claim every section of the FDCPA has been violated. It’s refreshing to see a court call these types of complaints what they are – insufficient. As shown by this Order, courts in Alabama are already listening. Additionally, the industry has seen an influx of these channel of preference cases. The court’s well-thought-out distinction between Reg F and the FDCPA can be useful for any organization that finds itself on the receiving end of such claims.